# Do Index Funds Beat Stock Picking in the Long Run

Passive index investing vastly outperforms active stock picking over the long run, driven primarily by the compounding drag of investment fees, behavioral investor errors, and the mathematical difficulty of consistently beating an efficient market. Decades of institutional data reveal that while active fund managers and individual retail investors occasionally outperform in the short term, over 10- and 20-year horizons, more than 90% of professional stock pickers fail to beat their benchmark indexes. For the overwhelming majority of investors, a low-cost, buy-and-hold index strategy remains the most statistically reliable path to long-term wealth generation.

## The Fundamental Debate: Active Management vs. Passive Indexing

For nearly a century, the financial services industry has been built on the premise that intelligent, well-resourced professionals can identify mispriced securities, time market entries and exits, and generate excess risk-adjusted returns, commonly known as "alpha." Active management requires constant fundamental research, technical analysis, and forecasting to construct a portfolio that theoretically beats a designated market benchmark. Proponents of active management argue that markets are emotional and reactive, providing astute managers with opportunities to exploit inefficiencies and protect capital during downturns [cite: 1, 2].

In contrast, passive investing is rooted in the Efficient Market Hypothesis. This financial theory postulates that all publicly available information is immediately and accurately reflected in stock prices, making it effectively impossible to consistently identify undervalued companies or predict short-term market movements [cite: 1, 3]. Rather than paying high fees to managers attempting to achieve the impossible, passive investors buy an index fund—a broad basket of securities that automatically tracks a market benchmark like the S&P 500. By holding a proportional share of the entire market, passive investors capture the overarching economic growth of the corporate sector without relying on predictive skill.

The philosophy of indexing was popularized in the modern era by John C. Bogle, the founder of the Vanguard Group, who revolutionized the retail investment landscape by launching the first retail index mutual fund in 1976 [cite: 4]. Bogle famously summarized the passive investing thesis by noting that the simple fact is that selecting a mutual fund that will outpace the stock market over the long term is like looking for a needle in the haystack, leading to his fundamental corollary: do not look for the needle in the haystack, simply buy the haystack [cite: 5, 6]. 

Decades later, empirical data from both academic institutions and financial industry scorekeepers overwhelmingly validates this thesis. The long-term debate between picking individual stocks and broadly indexing is largely settled by the mathematics of compounding and market efficiency. However, exploring why active management consistently fails—and understanding the psychological, structural, and macroeconomic nuances behind the data—remains critical for modern portfolio construction.

## The Empirical Reality: Analyzing Decades of Institutional Data

The most definitive scorekeepers of the active versus passive debate are the S&P Indices Versus Active (SPIVA) Scorecard and the Morningstar Active/Passive Barometer. Both of these massive, semiannual research series track the performance of actively managed mutual funds and exchange-traded funds against their passive benchmarks across various asset classes, geographic regions, and time horizons. The overwhelming consensus across both datasets is that active managers struggle to survive, let alone outperform, over any meaningful investment horizon.

### The Near-Impossibility of Long-Term Outperformance

The data paints a highly challenging picture for active managers. According to the SPIVA U.S. Scorecard for Year-End 2024, short-term outperformance by active managers is occasionally possible, but long-term success is vanishingly rare. Over the 15-year period ending in December 2024, not a single one of the 22 U.S. equity fund categories saw a majority of its active managers outperform their respective benchmarks [cite: 7]. In 2024 specifically, an environment characterized by massive large-cap technology dominance, 65% of all active large-cap U.S. equity funds underperformed the S&P 500, a deterioration from the 60% failure rate observed in 2023 [cite: 8]. 

When extending the horizon to 20 years, the statistics become even more severe, proving that time is the ultimate enemy of the active manager. In the largest and most heavily scrutinized category, all large-cap domestic funds, nearly 92% of active managers failed to beat the S&P 500 over a 20-year period [cite: 9].

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The Morningstar Active/Passive Barometer approaches the data using a slightly different methodology, measuring a fund's "success rate." Morningstar defines success as whether an active fund can both survive the entire time period and beat its average passive peer on an asset-weighted basis. Morningstar’s 2025 report concluded that actively managed funds struggled heavily, with just 37% of U.S. stock-pickers surviving and beating their passive composites over the trailing one-year period [cite: 10]. Long-term results were even more challenging. Over the decade ending in 2025, just 7% of active U.S. large-cap funds successfully survived and outperformed their passive counterparts [cite: 10].

The distribution of 10-year excess returns for surviving active funds also skews heavily negative for U.S. large-cap funds. This statistical skew indicates that the performance penalty for picking an underperforming manager typically outweighs the mathematical reward for finding one of the rare winners [cite: 11, 12].

### The Illusion of Survivorship Bias and Style Drift

A critical nuance in analyzing historical fund performance is the concept of survivorship bias. Many actively managed funds that perform poorly are quietly liquidated or merged into better-performing funds by their parent companies to hide an embarrassing track record. If analysts only measured the performance of the funds that exist today and looked backward, active management would appear significantly more successful than it actually is. By tracking the entire opportunity set of funds available at the beginning of the period, rigorous studies like the SPIVA scorecard account for this fund mortality. 

The results regarding survivorship are striking. Over a 20-year period ending in 2024, nearly 64% of domestic stock funds and almost two-thirds of international equity funds were shuttered or folded into other portfolios [cite: 7, 13]. When an investor attempts to pick a winning active mutual fund today, they are fighting two distinct probabilities of failure: the probability that the fund will underperform the market, and the very real probability that the fund will completely cease to exist within a decade due to chronic underperformance [cite: 14].

Another factor obscuring true active performance is "style drift." The SPIVA scorecards frequently adjust their data to ensure managers are actually following their stated mandates. For example, if a small-cap value manager decides to buy a large quantity of large-cap growth stocks to chase a market rally, their performance might temporarily improve. However, this outperformance is not derived from their skill at picking small-cap stocks, but rather from drifting into a different asset class entirely [cite: 13]. In 2024, active small-cap managers had their best year on record, with only 30% underperforming the S&P SmallCap 600 [cite: 7]. While this appeared to be a vindication for active management, deeper analysis revealed it was driven by style bias; the S&P 500 outpaced the small-cap index by a massive 16 percentage points that year, meaning small-cap managers who drifted into large-cap holdings artificially inflated their returns rather than demonstrating genuine small-cap stock-picking skill [cite: 7].

### Long-Term Underperformance Across U.S. Market Caps

To illustrate the sheer breadth of the active management shortfall in domestic markets, the following table summarizes the SPIVA U.S. Scorecard's absolute return underperformance rates across major capitalization segments. As time horizons stretch from ten years to twenty years, the failure rate of active management approaches absolute certainty.

| U.S. Equity Fund Category | 10-Year Underperformance Rate | 20-Year Underperformance Rate |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| **All Domestic Funds** | 89.70% | 94.11% |
| **All Large-Cap Funds** | 84.34% | 91.99% |
| **All Mid-Cap Funds** | 77.32% | 90.93% |
| **All Small-Cap Funds** | 82.22% | 90.80% |
| **Real Estate Funds** | 82.42% | 90.12% |

*Data Source: SPIVA U.S. Scorecard, Year-End 2024. Table reflects the percentage of active funds that underperformed their respective S&P benchmarks on an absolute return basis [cite: 9].*

## Do Inefficient Markets Favor Stock Pickers?

A persistent industry narrative suggests that while passive index funds are superior in highly efficient, thoroughly researched markets like U.S. large-caps, active management is absolutely necessary for "inefficient" markets. Proponents of this view argue that small-cap stocks, emerging markets, and specialized international equities require active stock picking because these sectors are less transparent, less covered by Wall Street analysts, and more prone to fundamental mispricing [cite: 7, 15]. 

The long-run data thoroughly dismantles this narrative. While these markets may theoretically be less efficient, the transaction costs, research expenses, and management fees required to exploit those inefficiencies ultimately consume the generated alpha.

### The Small-Cap and Mid-Cap Illusion

Investors frequently assume that smaller companies offer a fertile hunting ground for active managers. However, as previously noted with the 2024 small-cap style drift anomaly, long-term data erases any perceived advantage. Over a 20-year horizon, 90.80% of all active U.S. small-cap funds fail to beat their benchmark, and 90.93% of mid-cap funds suffer the same fate [cite: 9]. The market for smaller companies is sufficiently institutionalized that finding consistent, actionable alpha is just as mathematically difficult as it is in the large-cap space. Morningstar's data corroborates this, showing that over a decade, just 25% of active small-cap managers survived and outperformed their average passive peer [cite: 10].

### International and Emerging Markets

If active management thrives in inefficiency, emerging markets and foreign exchanges should be highly lucrative for stock pickers. Yet, international SPIVA scorecards perfectly mirror the bleak outcomes of U.S. domestic markets.

The SPIVA India Scorecard reveals that despite being a rapidly developing and highly dynamic market, 74% of Indian large-cap active funds underperformed their index over a 10-year horizon ending in 2024 [cite: 16]. In the notoriously volatile Indian mid- and small-cap sector, a staggering 88% of active funds lagged their benchmark over a decade [cite: 17]. Furthermore, 84% of India's Equity-Linked Savings Schemes (ELSS) underperformed their broad market index over the same 10-year period [cite: 17]. 

Japan is another region frequently cited as a market requiring active intervention, known for its unique corporate governance structures and historically stubborn economic cycles. However, SPIVA data shows that over a 15-year period ending in 2025, over 80% of Japanese Large-Cap funds underperformed the S&P/TOPIX 150, while 68% of Japanese Mid/Small-Cap funds underperformed over the same horizon [cite: 18]. 

The underperformance extends across the entire European and Asian landscape. The SPIVA Europe scorecard reveals that 92% of euro-denominated global equity funds underperformed their benchmarks over a 10-year period, alongside 81% of UK equity funds [cite: 19]. In the Asia Ex-Japan region, 92% of funds across all reported categories failed to survive over a five-year period, with long-term underperformance rates remaining uniformly high [cite: 20].

| Global Market Region (10-Year Horizon) | Active Fund Underperformance Rate | Benchmark Index |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| **Europe (Pan-European Equities)** | 92.0% | S&P Europe 350 |
| **Europe (UK Equities)** | 81.0% | S&P United Kingdom BMI |
| **India (Large-Cap Equities)** | 74.0% | S&P India LargeMidCap |
| **India (Mid/Small-Cap Equities)** | 88.0% | S&P India SmallCap |
| **Japan (Large-Cap Equities)** | 80.0%+ (15-year) | S&P/TOPIX 150 |

*Data Sources: SPIVA Regional Scorecards (Europe, India, Japan) for periods ending 2023-2025 [cite: 17, 18, 19]. Note: Japanese 10-year data fluctuates, but 15-year data conclusively exceeds 80% underperformance.*

The data forces a universal conclusion: irrespective of geography, market capitalization, or perceived market inefficiency, the vast majority of active stock pickers lose to passive indexes over the long run.

## The Tyranny of Compounding Costs

The primary driver of active management's long-term failure is not that professional analysts lack intelligence, education, or access to information. It is a simple matter of mathematics. Before costs are applied, the aggregate return of all active investors mathematically equals the return of the overall market, because active and passive investors combined make up the entire market. Therefore, after trading costs and management fees are deducted, the average active investor must fundamentally underperform the average passive investor [cite: 21]. 

This dynamic is referred to as the "Cost Matters Hypothesis." Every dollar spent on management fees, trading commissions, and administrative overhead is a dollar permanently removed from the compounding machine of the investment portfolio. 

### Historical Fee Compression and Current Averages

Over the past three decades, investors have become increasingly aware of this mathematical reality, leading to a massive migration of capital toward low-cost index products. According to the Investment Company Institute (ICI), on an asset-weighted basis, average expense ratios incurred by mutual fund investors have fallen substantially since 1996 [cite: 22]. In 1996, equity mutual fund investors incurred expense ratios of 1.04% on average. By 2025, that average had fallen to 0.40% [cite: 22].

Despite this industry-wide fee compression, a massive gap remains between active and passive strategies. In 2025, the asset-weighted average expense ratio for an actively managed equity mutual fund was 0.64% [cite: 22]. In stark contrast, the average expense ratio for an index equity mutual fund was just 0.05%, and 0.14% for index equity ETFs [cite: 22]. 

While a fee difference of roughly 0.60% (60 basis points) may seem inconsequential in a single calendar year, the mathematics of compounding turns this small, persistent leak into a devastating drain over a lifetime of investing. Active managers face the insurmountable hurdle of not only matching the index's gross return but exceeding it consistently by a margin large enough to cover their overhead, marketing, and trading costs. The data proves that almost none can clear this hurdle over the span of a career.

### The SEC's Mathematics of Portfolio Decay

The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) actively warns investors about the long-term, corrosive impact of ongoing investment fees. The regulatory body notes that when an investor pays a fee, they do not merely lose that specific cash amount; they permanently lose all the future compounding growth that money would have generated over decades of market exposure [cite: 23].

Consider the SEC's baseline mathematical illustration: an initial investment of $100,000 growing at a conservative 4% annually over a 20-year horizon.
*   With an ongoing annual fee of **0.25%**, the portfolio grows to approximately **$208,000**.
*   With an ongoing annual fee of **0.50%**, the portfolio grows to approximately **$198,000**.
*   With an ongoing annual fee of **1.00%**, the portfolio grows to approximately **$179,000** [cite: 24, 25].

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In this standard scenario, choosing an actively managed fund with a 1.00% fee instead of a passive index fund with a 0.25% fee costs the investor nearly $30,000 in lost wealth—almost a third of their original principal [cite: 24, 26]. Morningstar's data confirms this cost-performance relationship in the real world, finding that funds in the cheapest fee quintile succeed more than twice as often as funds in the priciest quintile over a 10-year period [cite: 27, 28].

## The Individual Investor's Dilemma: Behavioral Finance

If institutional fund managers—backed by advanced algorithmic models and armies of elite analysts—cannot beat the market after accounting for fees, what hope does the individual retail investor have in picking single stocks? Academic research demonstrates that individual investors fare significantly worse than both professional active managers and passive indexes. This underperformance is not merely a matter of lacking information, but rather the result of deeply ingrained behavioral biases.

### The "Dumb Money" Penalty

A landmark peer-reviewed study by economists Brad Barber and Terrance Odean tracked the actual trading records of 65,000 households at a major discount brokerage firm [cite: 29]. The researchers sorted the investors into quintiles based on their portfolio turnover, which measures how frequently they traded and rebalanced their accounts. 

The results provided a devastating indictment of active retail trading. The "buy-and-hold" investors—the 20% who traded the least actively—earned an annual return of 18.5% net of trading costs during the study period. In sharp contrast, the most active stock-picking traders earned just 11.4% annually. The act of aggressively picking stocks and attempting to time the market resulted in an economically massive 7 percentage point penalty per year [cite: 29]. 

### The Behavioral Gap and Human Error

Why do individual investors underperform so severely? Through extensive analysis, behavioral economists have identified several psychological hurdles that sabotage retail stock pickers. First is the "Disposition Effect," which describes an irrational human tendency to sell winning investments too early in order to lock in a feeling of triumph, while simultaneously holding onto losing investments for far too long to avoid the psychological pain of realizing a loss [cite: 30, 31]. This ensures that retail portfolios are routinely cleared of their best-performing assets while accumulating depreciating stocks.

Second, unlike institutional investors who systematically screen thousands of equities based on fundamental metrics, retail investors suffer from a profound search problem. They engage in "attention-driven buying," overwhelmingly purchasing stocks that capture their attention through news headlines, extreme price volatility, or social media hype. Because they only notice the stock after it has made the news, retail investors usually enter the trade after the market has already priced in the positive development, buying at the top of the cycle [cite: 29, 30]. 

### Real-World Capital Destruction

This behavioral drag is not merely theoretical; it results in billions of dollars in lost wealth annually. DALBAR, a financial research firm, publishes an annual Quantitative Analysis of Investor Behavior (QAIB) report that tracks the actual returns realized by mutual fund investors compared to market benchmarks. The data consistently shows that investors are their own worst enemies.

The 2024 QAIB report revealed that while the S&P 500 soared 25.02% for the year, the average equity fund investor captured a return of just 16.54% [cite: 32]. This 848-basis-point (8.48%) gap was driven entirely by human behavior—specifically, panic selling during temporary dips, poor rebalancing, and tactical moves that missed unexpected market rallies [cite: 33, 34]. According to DALBAR, withdrawals from equity funds occurred in every single quarter of 2024, with the largest retail outflows happening during the third quarter, precisely before a major market surge [cite: 33, 34]. 

This phenomenon extended a losing streak for the average equity investor to 15 consecutive years of underperforming the S&P 500 [cite: 34]. By divorcing the investor from the emotional, anxiety-inducing process of picking stocks and timing entries, index funds effectively protect investors from their own worst psychological impulses.

## Structural Risks of Indexing: When Passive Goes Too Far

While passive investing is undeniably superior for individual wealth generation, the meteoric rise of index funds has introduced novel structural risks to the broader macroeconomic system. Over the past three decades, passive strategies have grown to account for roughly half of all U.S. equity fund assets [cite: 35, 36]. The core academic and regulatory critiques of this massive shift center on market concentration, diminished liquidity, and degraded price discovery.

### The Magnificent Seven and Concentration Risk

Passive index funds, such as those tracking the S&P 500, are generally market-capitalization weighted. This structural design means that as a company grows more valuable, the index fund is forced to buy a proportionally larger share of its stock, regardless of the company's underlying fundamental valuation or forward-looking earnings potential [cite: 37, 38]. 

This mechanic has led to historically unprecedented market concentration. As of early 2026, the so-called "Magnificent Seven" mega-cap technology stocks (Apple, Microsoft, Nvidia, Amazon, Alphabet, Meta, and Tesla) account for roughly a third of the entire S&P 500's market capitalization [cite: 39]. Furthermore, nearly 70% of the economic profit in the S&P 500 is generated by just the top 10 companies [cite: 40]. 

Because passive index investors are blindly allocating roughly 33 cents of every new investment dollar into just seven companies, they are exposed to massive concentration risk. If a sector-specific shock—such as an artificial intelligence spending slowdown, regulatory intervention, or a bursting of an AI-driven valuation bubble—were to hit these specific mega-caps, the broader index would suffer disproportionately [cite: 37, 40, 41]. 

Ironically, this extreme concentration is a primary reason active managers currently struggle to beat the index. Institutional risk-management mandates and diversification rules often prevent active mutual funds from holding 30% of their portfolio in just seven stocks. Consequently, when those specific mega-cap stocks soar, active funds inherently underperform the cap-weighted index [cite: 40].

### Liquidity and the Distortion of Price Discovery

Beyond the risks of concentration, economists and regulatory bodies, including the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank, have begun scrutinizing how passive flows alter fundamental market mechanics. 

The first concern is liquidity risk during market downturns. Because index funds trade baskets of stocks automatically in response to retail inflows and outflows, they trade without any regard for the fundamental value of the underlying companies [cite: 3, 42]. In a severe market panic, passive funds must indiscriminately sell shares to meet redemptions. Research indicates that this automated, fundamental-agnostic selling can overwhelm market liquidity, reduce price elasticity, and severely amplify downside price volatility [cite: 35, 43]. 

The second concern is degraded price discovery, often referred to as the "Index Effect." The Efficient Market Hypothesis relies on active traders doing the hard, expensive work of analyzing companies to set accurate prices. If the vast majority of capital becomes passive, the market loses the critical mass of active analysts required to process new information. Academic research suggests that high levels of passive ownership lead to increased "comovement"—where stocks move up and down together as a monolith rather than based on their individual earnings announcements—and a general decrease in pricing efficiency [cite: 42, 44, 45]. Furthermore, index funds face a "free rider problem," where they are structurally disincentivized from spending resources to engage in corporate governance or challenge entrenched management, as incurring those expenses would cause their specific fund to lag behind competing, perfectly passive index trackers [cite: 2].

However, despite these macroeconomic concerns regarding price discovery and systemic fragility, the theoretical threshold at which passive investing truly "breaks" the market has not yet been reached. None of these structural critiques alter the current mathematical reality that individual index investors consistently outperform active managers.

## The Middle Ground: The Core and Satellite Strategy

For investors who acknowledge the statistical superiority of passive index funds but still desire the intellectual engagement, thematic alignment, or potential upside of picking individual stocks, the financial advisory industry has popularized the "Core and Satellite" asset allocation strategy [cite: 46, 47].

This modern portfolio framework seeks to bridge the gap between human behavioral desires and harsh empirical realities by compartmentalizing risk. 

*   **The Passive Core (70% - 90%):** The vast majority of the portfolio's capital is invested in broadly diversified, low-cost passive index funds or ETFs, such as a Total Stock Market Index or an S&P 500 tracker. This component anchors the portfolio, ensuring the investor safely captures reliable, long-term market beta while keeping overall fees and turnover minimal [cite: 48, 49].
*   **The Active Satellite (10% - 30%):** The remaining, smaller portion of capital is utilized for active stock picking, thematic ETFs (such as artificial intelligence, clean energy, or biotechnology), or high-conviction actively managed mutual funds. This acts as a designated, risk-contained "sandbox." It allows the investor to take targeted risks in pursuit of alpha, express specific macroeconomic views, or engage intellectually with the market, without jeopardizing their entire financial future if those active bets inevitably fail [cite: 47, 50].

By strictly defining the boundaries of their active trading, investors can satisfy the psychological urge to participate dynamically in the market while ensuring their long-term retirement is protected by the mathematical certainty and cost-efficiency of the passive haystack.

## Bottom line

The long-run data is absolutely unambiguous: whether evaluating highly compensated professional mutual fund managers or individual retail day-traders, active stock picking is a mathematically losing proposition over extended time horizons. Burdened by compounding management fees, severe behavioral biases, and the sheer pricing efficiency of modern financial markets, more than 90% of active equity funds fail to beat their passive benchmarks over a 20-year period. While the meteoric, decades-long rise of index funds has introduced valid systemic concerns regarding market concentration and the fragility of price discovery, a low-cost, broadly diversified index strategy remains the most robust, cost-effective, and evidence-based mechanism for long-term wealth accumulation.

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81. [S&P Global: SPIVA Japan](https://www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/spiva/article/spiva-japan/)
83. [S&P Global: SPIVA US Year-End 2024 Summary](https://www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/spiva/article/spiva-us-year-end-2024/)
85. [IFA: SPIVA Report Active vs Passive](https://www.ifa.com/articles/spiva-report-active-vs-passive)
86. [ICFS: The Bottom Line on Active vs Passive](https://icfs.com/specialists-desk/spiva-scorecard-results)
90. [Reyman Wealth: Active vs Passive in India](https://www.reymanwealth.com/post/active-vs-passive-investing-in-india-a-decisive-guide)
91. [S&P Global: SPIVA India Scorecard](https://www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/documents/spiva/spiva-india-scorecard-year-end-2024.pdf)
95. [ETF Express: Morningstar Barometer Success for Active Managers](https://etfexpress.com/2025/03/11/morningstars-active-passive-barometer-finds-mixed-success-for-active-managers/)
96. [Morningstar: Active/Passive Barometer Insights](https://www.morningstar.com/business/insights/research/active-passive-barometer)
97. [Employee Fiduciary: Active and Passive Funds](https://www.employeefiduciary.com/blog/active-and-passive-funds)
99. [Morningstar: US Active/Passive Barometer Report (Mid-Year 2024)](https://assets.contentstack.io/v3/assets/blt4eb669caa7dc65b2/blte7224d06fe1faf84/66df6bf5a193e5d7e23bb9c9/Morningstar_US_Active_Passive_Barometer_Mid_Year_2024.pdf)
100. [S&P Global: SPIVA US Year-End 2024 Full Report](https://www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/documents/spiva/spiva-us-year-end-2024.pdf)

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11. [humbledollar.com](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQHsdQMsUJLeUerbNDBxLZbVZsr57YHTvYuyTHWWolW9puadqjkF1Xu_QW8xkFRzhRemRK0XbQ9D00AOgH7b4Lg3UfvQkffpI1YW_5Z-WU4vCNii3yk6xVoQgwBBl28z7jOw472fub_Q3G2OsFwSHupypdDfuFqw4atwGG1To4wGgWLftn7aUhSLZdJerwoTDooPNlIqIDQg1zSrT6xHkJ51ng==)
12. [contentstack.io](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQEg5-Znio2dL6ZCvP3iyQuEOVBguvpB1_71JLMUkwEtHZC1BUeMX9-z_KuWOBIIumhTeFnbJXqhr-oPk5uq6bgCwPdIAQM9Ea5wwsSQ4Ymok7m-KUV-D6Ylobe60hu9UvzVPsFPlpJ9GzlJpdVMVNbQaSudYrgZAELjn6cCqNQgBrAi5u3FOESSCSeRDJ0H89TYAKtzguzP8smGB2VXCeQPLaanP3pi-SZT3wlGK3Hu4Atag5ykydQOOM_-vwMihBjDfebZcFGuKr-kKOjwaexhpY6ds1E4tL3FZA==)
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14. [etfexpress.com](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQFTlFKzwSK6oMxiO01mR7prchj8RfPXsVw4b-iDDA9DNt8NFhVQRcb0-MKzdwlXyR-1nfdy9OLMcJayyR0TgvO6eJ9_JPpf9NV6C8yJYG85Dc6Wa4rGd-VEaY1PWu8Ttl2Yz1qiTDJlnvGjwh7L1qw8P5OslhmXB0S59E8f96Gz9loS2yCbidLP4N5jdx5LGDPTcGUQTXfLRR2aMyiW5pOfek-rAS1-)
15. [morningstar.com](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQHGoj73VZANJb8VOuy0A6GEDEUOXUmcOF4KVuyO5IjF7jAEc10j_h1R03IN6Jr51Or3I_JpvyKrxQF0wvKlDPu0JEzF4BTwY3M7s4zWTzC16DL_kZ9I6vmslrAY2uMaDn0hEZqnDi9soCgtwCatqyEvXoEAeD2IQ9xGTqtSCmuVO-GfO8v4X8Wyp9Pnsiq2fSKLVA==)
16. [reymanwealth.com](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQEZ7iz13Y5g8jM2W0TZLXnWafzp4bJMxEg4aUHT5vA3poYI-hVUf9Mix-ESa1mDkU4Udu9TSrQYqzyvu0lu6D2HOhXQlG0tVfECyH0tPfjyv-OsuDrZaXm82USfYrgN_LlfNS6fQ8NbgDC7Gy9IwJIPfvYQeocrfnBxpQv8i1kDeqe0vLOACpSwVcnrYdc=)
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18. [spglobal.com](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQE7_Kdt2TzHyXfwbf2Pbeb-9eza-6NKVvogLiN2HSM93DZiHtu_F-fxxZo2GmSQeWKrKIuHQnJo_Ch6h2tO0NdHLJxVxyrVGef8lgs2z03q4ZUX2kdmsEIR4cyIhTpyZ-M7HAGd0hr_CNo00N27UmBb5BM=)
19. [etfstream.com](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQHSl5hWNj5Da3Xr8wB8PlO3cJDhsJZoWeMS4Vm3AOkgtNGgUGt2kHTflENZNe5YvoubeqJ52DaAQM0XBlVCVZrUJhQY4xh4WX84YtPB0FSlp8gwdImSR-7Ixj0kl9O-gLJftBhuiytaupgTKcm0moOD3JDPa2ACV22qfat8VBUbm-cZ-0MDXDW7yq5oOiWY8oyQS0bEBjmr1FvprdanwuuJTECXQ1ru)
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29. [invariantinvestments.com](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQH7Faou21yDOYNbwCFfdY6EpqXSy63jntarOyxXStwCz6jVYZcX22IF2NF275MBTgmzfXmHmaEMLXlhCy2lIK5WQop17d5pXiFJKWBK51Ga-2YzJ8otlAp5OnX904rQjZ95XxCGNkAU_qnCozHUup_8pHtR6hBIY4dlUfZEhfEQrkhhZsOq9pj4w91WVcaXLvVT5TLSYzmUgRaS)
30. [repec.org](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQF5Sl736mT83lp1oGPFSl8rhBCwhsvn5OYsEaq5fogPSgDd25fP4tNgD5BrQIVQkxCzDUnrs6KWS0dbvIY3HqutI5S79L19bl_zELHJ5vB7iJ2jplJMZTMlUYydJFx7G6Yt_p8pwPgQQd4fe5Im)
31. [umass.edu](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQG24fV8_Uji-pRBNtg7AvIth9sBBQRmX4xWRo1Zoq631ZXeSd-61yE9vzcLcW76OvaNBNQDgK0C9MDcHjOtlj0j9kwHKre-KRrHE20eFAGdc80LjcxULWivZDi-iv_gS4qez9Wi_uzYYpClkp6rFcNlpgT0KooikcXKa00MW-9eEPfjf00g)
32. [dalbar.com](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQH_xx4mB7EkJKmE0bnhEKdBC9jIo1zp6A8CMq7mxC4OXes6O2uxnwUMeet1hb_mXegOl4p1IBi_S_Q7AI6u8jpMpeyZeOnOKlmXX5RRDfs3aoaAGIrrLPvsmajCkONJyo4ThM23C4n3o2A67-EaEKye6Tw20zc6UU-Oq4X9rpWWeCVItaqo21pYj9RdDwavvTFr5iVl3Zxh82YV715pWgg8Wx6iK7J2rDjFYctqmmHloFzoNxRfReOSQg==)
33. [prnewswire.com](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQFTzzWorY0Cfxbv-zCLWJx_BmLH53HJujxqLo9H8-rpC37lhhQUahsxOj4ng_wTcM_BOssoQP4jxuzo1ypEV3W9wZIo4uVkWoO3E3G6vM2h-Aow4VqaGDSltZzflUkZPh9vgmKkCT6lzucQeiRDqPMdUHz0qNkaJl9QFO1rFN-AwZJvlUmcnt-1Wwt22O9IAUdadGpDoENKYG7R7HaX0oQxJukBnsJ8bCSthaHPNO6jE8iH8c4pQH3NbufVM_uaoqoA9RnBPbkXF0o9-Q==)
34. [planadviser.com](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQH5v1_O-POrk4TlCrYVmV-F9EZ44RXZmoLtQZDCGOBYFnSyQ0K4PAHRXKXslWd0XMGbmtbzRWvq5LOlbU-3uYPRdNypGk0idZgClOIJd-Jyz46oX4WH8-LjzUmiA2O446GyPX7Woi6AVu4vtOIs5WmNru0p2nyK3A6Fy6A15h9XFlQhe5Gg-SH56Q==)
35. [apolloacademy.com](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQFjt7d3sky3V214kFdUIdVu8idRLBocY7b154gKi6CTIzt7_9kXSVyPaAn4hFrT6bQTOzAVVO7_SVt88qIO7HYhkhNeH-e5DZy6e-mI_0RlJPvhOwao1nQXE3wYRuIjtM-sH72lyVchvxvyDm6AbJTrKYLGShV5IzqexMMudoKda50s528woPB9YSmbwhs03XLUq2oT81A9N1xLd7A=)
36. [ici.org](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQGUbk4Ll2RbHLpyBpwrDCKmfiuXI2nbSTai42zChTiwPkdFZ3G2UmpXpWRhoq2PagEJdfG3CKvSFyL8ohUu_5A27fLDuuyo2h4GloUnL3-JmsRNJKOlsnxxlrvG2Feqmpcp)
37. [investing.com](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQExT4JqHR0Sah-i0tUUF3ypZM9kLILoJHwN4lXtI5jZ0ADUPK4-gxMFvqQeZP496X6Ipghy3Bs3wws6oE84vy0BxEFbOMihPYSX7NZWD-yhnvsYMgO9bMiIHPmv66iLbRxZ3czfgZtqz-KPvAe956NcwIaCBpaLrAeFt58X-Rn2klUxt1JSwUKIXB0z9-yyHDwELtR4ccTrytkdz9pr)
38. [dynamicalphasolutions.com](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQFaf-mjzMbCtAGjUhKjJ_DNviKIlj_dxe7PQSFf32AvP_lJLQmgDoeJnhkaE3NudWtl2z6EobTkfdLWdaxrTuUQoidJThgz4M8VXTybkZp6PdcNPV4OEjmjuqXG5iPlFaDeSE5mTcwuFV0YUWlIaF1lGygACJ3_mmZiKjVqy6j-lrg1B1M=)
39. [investmentnews.com](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQH0jh26UoXVbkImfRQAhfhJxSOKxy0r76IEgPlWj3jBc0-BBXWl5PWH-OZVqo9bcD7ZqMZYWtIo6u9VQW6MUHZzagkV7N6jQCJ3iV_yO1dxlIQFvb83q14CLYZPrGleZdFk4iGH33B5E3xH9pmqBxSrYa9i2WvjuQ==)
40. [russellinvestments.com](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQEw3mWRV8JXVw4wluuiRqFLLXD5TdY9f9Io1-L_tVGz7yUb_0mxTkfZncuP0nW7KDU_MfL_hoyv3lAjo-vfDjFQ5FwQGv0sqN8dgadL_8bYJPRZj9eEpQE0yhWtdtVDT65qKBTTqW8GzxAfHq-Trkut3VQenraZkqsj_6DdJZe4wbSNO-4U1sQPStr9nd-3Tb4ppW-ljQwlrpev6fObjRCpX1bTzjJraXDdKIjTj-kDAOh5O5FP0HXQjuZNnjCt3Hu2QS4mlUoVfUwxMeg=)
41. [morganstanley.com](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQGAMZ3Ik3uLByxwTWMxAg_qvRpzWHjf3QoSpPF-0Y5nQmTt_yr9bPAkZDN7olLU_g9wun9lxtDzlsei0tITYjmvAAthz9EZfC5fA8Eply9ibc_NnGyPICc01U1An3yjN-kiQVH85lhQjSVVv46hrUDoaO2AAJJ_mohl5yzEuw==)
42. [europa.eu](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQGYObIaG8rdAuJswoLa6-Zal_UMwGlZ_zjOuUiuVR3N13Uqfkn38y-DpfKWP5QbR6iXO0LjKJ3wAwC6WARZlnLR7BmOepz-ALRlJelV-22-nENVtPZYOPZFO2WoQrKFW7j7QOk-jK7czZY-fX1v-hBx4Fo9lldWMkT_cbPOkq3DzHpkLxAyP-jOOOp8mSVGyRmZRQvu4OG7T4tT8elqO-JDk3Ecd6kXZwOPSZly2vObBOI=)
43. [researchgate.net](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQHNm14_zLKGmWU0_WrOSunN-LsChEB7TvpAU5VjZaME9E_E25J1lDuGKwrg69f7Sy9UalaZGxOvL5vWeIQ0neZNCqda1f55GkW3cWcepMbmnVLOwE9TVGJ-qaDxrmDidfHTelMG7gujANqlh1VDhACUEXG-2InQopZZqLhhf7k-2Jz6Lx97lOnEWqd2O1SntZ9wikuMiPg7J4_dGQ5d7EX0CukW9ypGeo2VOqm--ZDt9g==)
44. [bryant.edu](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQHx8yYonVd7wUVKTb1sGnhMOzGUHWH9rWSa4nI2-TAg0FC6RbkvZp1-IvNI-nlJJVqMlWu_g-CnpfcbGNTZY6QOoSLkOOW695pvcjByr1p4r3QOBgGuMdjb5E8hMHpdbKAa_F8jC1sxikh17xYgmtjtVBv7MacHzIAKoSHnzOoVbwCWHxA8zx3ABPV6ACoPsg==)
45. [uark.edu](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQFvbMCBSwiw5pTpe8kfjSVLKF3YaSGF_8wyj9_howaxUVvjUmmgBnzdO6RnNtQ7NLwBTph6EU6Wicb1L8Smca0Z1xlLwAMkCVPtpv-FmRKg1cdjPG2RrWGsAHbab-whxPyWowEBRwGFuqAjj6QzFv_-NFsYdAn2XXuo1xpsQY4YnQ==)
46. [etf.com](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQG8Pg9Mb9Qvb-Ql0n_U4LvhRNSZKrmoqIKGB6mhE2aCQst9eQ7XFZWvhsLWdA5QonmirbFt64LZw1dEKQLJpvJuJcTYNzYS6HpH7kA7TW83Yf5S38rp_LAKcG7Az0uwF3B-ND01PkY=)
47. [sharesoc.org](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQEuOZRjUv3gvGj72FRya3jTTreZjiVViPArQrwinN3vpK20NSzZiaElSYbAdpyweAlHNCGpui_l5yhy6J6cPDXU4vJU1Qcdxegc7BFoHP2WPFgdO68pBY3X6L9uCC4QKslHBZHM-K_pMAAo-WY5GZJejAAGeWm_UNtmSpllwb0uej3zIVmHGe-JFmDQj0WqobeEYhtbT5SO7KrGBNs=)
48. [oclc.org](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQHgZ32--_FHRJznphcyps-zUdH8ISpyvJU_1WG28hpi4zVseyEUUu7RBGkMtNNDpNjrkD8PiEFX8dhKQFaqArt45rV15Wuq_s9fnGnWExJjIoqQz9--wsequc8u7TiI85VCKD4p-QM0Vm8Q5KT1InBFegweMShJdbZaOmrs_dlvDkTAeUThKa1bO8aARxY6)
49. [home.saxo](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQHDKoGnl8-H2RQfenFVQFsEkXDCcof8HqgJmsjVrzl3cbbeohAD8u9taXFLtyowwN2MJif8mnFw6qYVfL5w0mEb1FgOUBmYb1OlMn6WLjqVHDO3VN1NbzBThA7kt-nn3y5mrlpiWms2hFDarUbucbiiT8VVpfJnXGGXc6HPYKpcanl2BmPhjjxC1B8ewlGHMwdUnnzhp5eHe46ht1Se6ModClmhdK9qsDR1JCOP)
50. [sharesforbeginners.com](https://vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com/grounding-api-redirect/AUZIYQHX67U6ApRVLUvtLaPhuBKZmyDZEVh9zAug_ldFKkw5HBeLyXJ4AzHi0yX60D58YSyjlzo6eXSiVqvhM9YGd1-Zmqc14db2ons8OqDI28GlhFRkJz9kmgYz1flne0ZGzvnfBGm2nyGVYvki4bV1WGpLeYv3KlJvvdQK)